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Abstract
We give an introduction to federated Byzantine agreement systems
(FBAS) with many examples ranging from small “academic” cases to
the current Stellar network. We then analyze the main concepts from a
mathematical and an algorithmic point of view. Based on work of La-
chowski [7] we derive algorithms for quorum enumeration, checking quo-
rum intersection, and computing the intact nodes with respect to a given
set of ill-behaved (Byzantine) nodes. We also show that from the view-
point of the intactness probability of nodes, which we introduce in this
paper, a hierarchical setup of nodes is inferior to an arrangement that we
call a symmetric simple FBAS. All algorithms described in this paper are
implemented in the Python package Stellar Observatory1 , which is also
used in some of the computed examples.
Keywords – Byzantine agreement, consensus, distributed computing, quorum
systems, federated Byzantine agreement, intactness probability, Stellar consensus pro-
tocol, Stellar network
1 Introduction
The main idea of blockchain technology is to maintain a distributed ledger in
a decentralized way. This means that the ledger is replicated among a set
of different parties or nodes, and no central entity has the authority on the
content of the ledger [14]. Transactions included in the ledger are recorded in
blocks which point to previous blocks, thus forming a chain of blocks. Nodes
need to reach consensus (see, e.g., [16] or [3, p. 659]) on the next block in
order to be included in the chain despite facing arbitrary (Byzantine) failures of
some nodes such as going offline or proposing an invalid block. Consequently,
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every blockchain system requires an underlying consensus model, which ideally
is based on a thorough mathematical formalization and analysis.
In this paper we study a consensus model introduced by Mazières in 2016 [13],
the federated Byzantine agreement system (FBAS), which is used in the Stellar2
Consensus Protocol (SCP). The main practical advantages of the SCP in com-
parison with other consensus mechanisms like proof-of-work or proof-of-stake
with the longest chain rule, or classical Byzantine agreement are discussed in
detail in [13, Section 2] and in [9, Section 2].
The nodes of an FBAS conceptually form a network, where the links be-
tween the nodes are established by trust decisions that are made by each node
individually, and hence in a decentralized way. A subset of nodes that a given
node “trusts” is called a quorum slice, and each node may have several such
slices. A quorum of the FBAS is a set of elements which contains at least one
quorum slice for each of its members, and hence may be interpreted as a subset
of nodes that “trusts itself”. In order to avoid that contradictory statements
are ratified, the quorums need to be pairwise intersecting. The quorum inter-
section property and several other concepts in the context of the FBAS lead
to challenging mathematical and computational problems which so far have not
been fully addressed in the literature. Our goal in this paper is contribute to the
overall understanding of FBAS by giving a thorough mathematical introduction
to the main ideas and concepts, in particular the quorum intersection problem
and the intactness of nodes. We will also treat these problems in detail from an
algorithmic point of view.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give the FBAS definition of
Mazières and illustrate it with several examples. We then introduce and analyze
the trust graph of an FBAS and derive a mathematical description of the current
Stellar network. In Section 3 we show that the quorum intersection decision
problem is NP-complete. A similar result was recently shown by Lachowski [7],
but here we show NP-completeness even when we restrict the decision problem
to the class of simple FBAS (see Definition 2.11). We then discuss algorithms
for quorum enumeration and checking quorum intersection. The main ideas of
these algorithms also appeared in the work of Lachowski [7], and some have been
implemented in Stellar Core3, the “backbone” of the Stellar network. Based on
these previous works, we give an in-depth treatment of both algorithms.
In Section 4 we analyze the intactness of nodes, characterize the intact nodes
in symmetric simple FBAS, and compare the original intactness definition of
Mazières with newer definitions given in [9, 10]. In Section 5 we treat intactness
algorithmically, and based on results from Section 3, we derive an algorithm
for computing the intact nodes when a set of ill-behaved (Byzantine) nodes is
given. The time complexity of this algorithm is (only) twice as long as deter-
mining quorum intersection. Finally, in Section 6 we look at intactness from a
probabilistic point of view, and we study the probability that a node is intact
in different scenarios of ill-behaved nodes.
2https://www.stellar.org
3https://github.com/stellar/stellar-core
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2 Federated Byzantine Agreement Systems
In this section we first review the basic definition and give some simple examples
of federated Byzantine agreement systems, then discuss their relationship to
certain graphs, and finally derive a mathematical description of the current
Stellar network.
2.1 Basic definitions and examples
We start with the following definition, originally given by Mazières [13, p. 4].
Definition 2.1 (FBAS and quorum). A federated Byzantine agreement system
(FBAS) is a pair (V, S) consisting of a finite set of nodes V and a quorum
function S : V → P(P(V )) \ {∅}, where for each v ∈ V and s ∈ S(v) we require
that v ∈ s. Each set s ∈ S(v) is called a quorum slice of the node v.
A nonempty set of nodes Q ⊆ V is called a quorum in (V, S) if for each v ∈ Q
there exists a quorum slice s ∈ S(v) with s ⊆ Q.
Note that we require that S(v) 6= ∅ for every node v. Therefore Q = V is a
quorum in (V, S), so that each FBAS has at least one quorum. Also note that
if Q1, Q2 are quorums, then Q1 ∪Q2 is a quorum as well.
Remark 2.2. In a more recent paper on Stellar as a global payment network,
the authors define a quorum to be “a non-empty set of nodes encompassing
at least one quorum slice of each non-faulty member” [9, p. 4]. In contrast to
Definition 2.1, this definition of quorums includes the individual behavior of
the nodes (which is unknown a priori and uncontrollable). In this paper we
will focus on the FBAS as originally defined by Mazìeres, and thus consider
the individual node behavior only later, when defining the concept of intactness
(see Definition 4.7). A comparison of the original and the new concepts is given
in Section 4.2. We stress that in the analysis of consensus mechanisms it is
very important to pay great attention to details. Already Lamport, Shostak
and Pease in their classical paper on the Byzantine generals problem from 1982
“strongly advise the reader to be very suspicious of ... nonrigorous reasoning”
and write that they “know of no area in computer science or mathematics in
which informal reasoning is more likely to lead to errors than in the study of
this type of algorithm” [8, p. 385].
A quorum slice s ∈ S(v) is interpreted as a subset of the nodes that the
node v “trusts”. The set S(v) should be chosen so that v will agree with any
statement that is unanimously agreed upon by any of the slices. A quorum
Q of the FBAS again is a subset of the nodes, where for each element v ∈ Q
at least one of its quorum slices (i.e., at least one subset of “trusted” nodes)
is completely contained in Q as well. Thus, a quorum is a set of nodes that
“trusts itself”. In practice quorums are not known a priori but discovered by
the nodes when exchanging messages. Each node sends its quorum slices with
every message. A receiving node considers a message to satisfy a quorum when
the set of the sending nodes contains a quorum slice of each of its elements.
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In a nutshell (see [13, Section 5.1] for details), a quorum Q ratifies a state-
ment if every node v ∈ Q asserts that this statement is true. Consensus means
that two contradicting statements should not be ratified at the same time. Thus,
the quorums of the FBAS should pairwise intersect, which naturally leads to
the following concept introduced by Mazières [13, p. 8].
Definition 2.3 (quorum intersection). An FBAS (V, S) has quorum intersec-
tion if any two of its quorums have a nonempty intersection.
Note that quorum intersection is not guaranteed without further assump-
tions. Moreover, the decision problem whether quorum intersection holds is
NP-complete; see Section 3.1 below for details. As described in [9, Section 6.2.1],
within Stellar Core the quorum intersection property of the underlying FBAS
is regularly checked with an algorithm based on an idea of Lachowski [7], which
we will analyze in detail in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
Remark 2.4. If Q1, . . . , Qm are the quorums of an FBAS (V, S) with quo-
rum intersection, then (V, {Q1, . . . , Qm}) is a (classical) quorum system. Such
systems have been studied since the late 1970s in the context of distributed
computing; see, e.g., the monograph [18] for an overview. The quorum system
(V, {Q1, . . . , Qm}) therefore may be analyzed using the concepts introduced in
this area, including load, capacity, and availability; see, e.g., [11, 12, 15]. A de-
tailed analysis of the relationship between FBAS and classical Byzantine quorum
systems was recently given in [4].
Let us give a few examples of federated Byzantine agreement systems.
Example 2.5. Let V = {1, . . . , n} for some n ≥ 2.
(1) Let S(i) = {{i}} for i = 1, . . . , n. Then every nonempty subset Q ⊆ V is
a quorum, since for every node i its only quorum slice is given by {i}, and we
trivially have {i} ⊆ Q. Clearly, (V, S) does not have quorum intersection.
(2) Let S(i) = {V } for i = 1, . . . , n. Now Q = V is the only quorum and (V, S)
has quorum intersection.
Example 2.6. Consider V = {1, . . . , n} for some n ≥ 2 and S(i) = {{i, j} | j =
1, . . . , n, j 6= i} for i = 1, . . . , n. Let U ⊆ V be any subset containing at least
two nodes. If we take any two nodes from U , say ℓ and m with ℓ 6= m, then
{ℓ,m} ∈ S(ℓ) and {ℓ,m} ∈ S(m), which shows that U is a quorum. If n ≥ 4,
then (V, S) does not have quorum intersection, since, e.g., {1, 2} and {3, 4} are
quorums.
Example 2.7 (Byzantine agreement). This example shows that classical Byzan-
tine agreement can be modeled as a special FBAS.
Let V = {1, . . . , n} for some n = 3m + 1, where m ∈ N, and suppose
that for i = 1, . . . , n, each quorum slice s ∈ S(i) contains at least 2m + 1
nodes (including i). Then any quorum of the FBAS (V, S) must consist of
at least 2m + 1 nodes, and since there are exactly 3m + 1 nodes, any two
quorums must intersect in at least m+ 1 nodes. If m nodes in the intersection
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become Byzantine, i.e., behave arbitrarily, then there still is at least one non-
Byzantine node in each intersection, which guarantees that the quorums cannot
ratify contradictory statements. And, as shown in a classical paper of Lamport,
Shostak, and Pease, “no solution with fewer than 3m+1 generals can cope with
m traitors” [8, p. 387]; also cf. Theorem 4.10 below.
Example 2.8. ([13, Fig. 7]) Consider V = {1, . . . , 7} and S with
S(i) = {{1, 2, 3, 7}}, i = 1, 2, 3, S(i) = {{4, 5, 6, 7}}, i = 4, 5, 6 ,
and S(7) = {{7}}. This FBAS (V, S) has exactly four quorums,
{1, 2, 3, 7}, {4, 5, 6, 7}, {7}, V,
and it has quorum intersection. Note that node 7 is contained in every quorum,
and that the minimal intersection of two quorums consists only of this node.
Example 2.9. Suppose that the FBAS is built by 4 organizations A,B,C,D,
which have 3 nodes each, i.e., V = A ∪B ∪C ∪D with
A = {a1, a2, a3}, B = {b1, b2, b3}, C = {c1, c2, c3}, D = {d1, d2, d3}.
Suppose that the quorum slices of each node xi, i = 1, 2, 3, are all sets consisting
of the three nodes of its own organizationX , and exactly one node from another
organization, i.e.,
S(xi) = {X ∪ {y} | y ∈ V \X}.
Then each node has 9 quorum slices containing 4 nodes each, and (V, S) does
not have quorum intersection, since A ∪B and C ∪D are quorums.
Example 2.10 (hierarchical quorum slices). Suppose that the FBAS is built
by 6 organizations, V = A ∪B ∪ C ∪D ∪ E ∪ F with
A = {a1, a2, a3}, B = {b1, b2, b3}, C = {c1, c2, c3},
D = {d1, d2, d3}, E = {e1, e2, e3}, F = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f5},
and suppose that the quorum slices are built in a hierarchical way: We form all
possible subsets of V by first choosing 5 of the 6 sets A,B,C,D,E, F , and then
in each of the 5 chosen sets we choose either 2 of the 3 nodes in case of the sets
A,B,C,D,E, or 3 of the 5 nodes in case of set F . Thus, each of these subsets
contains either 10 or 11 nodes, depending on whether on the “root level” of the
hierarchy the set F is chosen or not. In total there are 4 293 such subsets, and
we denote the union of all these sets by S.
We define the quorum function by
S(v) = {U ∈ S | v ∈ U}, v ∈ V,
then each node in the sets A,B,C,D,E has 2 322 quorum slices, and each node
in the set F has 2 430 quorum slices. This results in 37 888 quorums and we
have quorum intersection, with the minimal size of an intersection given by 4
nodes.
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As shown by the examples above, the definition of the FBAS allows quite
intricate systems of quorum slices and resulting quorums. We will now introduce
special FBAS classes that are of some practical relevance and can be analyzed
more easily than the general case. The idea of these classes is that the quorum
slices of each node are given by all possible subsets of a fixed cardinality that
can be drawn from a certain fixed subset of the nodes.
Definition 2.11 (simple and symmetric FBAS). An FBAS (V, S) is called
simple when there exist functions q : V → P(V ) and n : V → N, such that for
each node v ∈ V we have v ∈ q(v), 1 ≤ n(v) ≤ |q(v)|, and
S(v) = {U ⊆ q(v) | v ∈ U and |U | = n(v)}.
We denote a simple FBAS by (V, q, n). A simple FBAS is called symmetric
when for all v ∈ V we have q(v) = V and n(v) = k for some fixed k, where
1 ≤ k ≤ |V |, and we denote such an FBAS by (V, k).
Note that Example 2.5(1) is a simple FBAS with q(vi) = {vi} and n(vi) = 1,
Example 2.5(2) is a symmetric simple FBAS with k = n, and Example 2.6 is a
symmetric simple FBAS with k = 2.
Lemma 2.12. Let (V, k) be a symmetric simple FBAS. Then the set of all
quorums is given by {Q ⊆ V | |Q| ≥ k}, and the FBAS has quorum intersection
if and only if k > |V |/2.
Proof. It is easy to see that {Q ⊆ V | |Q| ≥ k} is the set of all quorums, since
for each node v ∈ V its quorum slices are given by all subsets of V containing
exactly k elements (including v itself). If k ≤ |V |/2, then there exist two disjoint
quorums. On the other hand, if k > |V |/2, then the pigeonhole principle implies
that the quorums are pairwise intersecting.
2.2 The trust graph
It is tempting to think of and to visualize the network of relationships that is
represented by an FBAS as a conventional directed graph, where the vertices
are given by the elements of V , and an edge between vi and vj exists when vj
is contained in a quorum slice of vi. While in general there is no one-to-one
correspondence between directed graphs and FBAS, the representation of an
FBAS by a directed graph is a useful tool for their analysis because it describes
the network of trust.
Definition 2.13 (trust graph and SCCs). The trust graph of the FBAS (V, S)
is the directed graph G = (V,E), where for every u, v ∈ V we have (u, v) ∈ E if
v ∈ s for some s ∈ S(u).
For every u, v ∈ V we say that v is reachable from u if there is a path from
u to v in G. We say that a set U ⊆ V is strongly connected in G if for every
u, v ∈ U the node u is reachable from v. Furthermore, we say that a nonempty
set C ⊆ V is a strongly connected component (abbreviated SCC) of G if it is
strongly connected and no proper superset of C is strongly connected.
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Figure 1: The strongly connected components of the FBAS from Example 2.8.
Note that due to the last condition, whenever C is an SCC and there is a
node v ∈ V such that every node in C is reachable from v, and v is reachable
from every node in C, then v ∈ C. The following result follows directly from
the transitivity of the reachability relation.
Lemma 2.14. If C and D are SCCs, then the following hold:
(1) C = D or C ∩D = ∅.
(2) Let c ∈ C and d ∈ D be such that d is reachable from c. Then every node
in D is reachable from every node in C.
The first statement of Lemma 2.14 implies that the set of SCCs form a
partition of V into disjoint nonempty subsets. The second statement implies
that the following notion of reachability of SCCs is well-defined and is a partial
order on SCCs.
Definition 2.15 (maximal and greatest SCC). Let C and D be SCCs. We say
that D is reachable from C if there are c ∈ C and d ∈ D such that d is reachable
from c. We say that an SCC is maximal if no other SCC is reachable from it.
We say that an SCC is the greatest SCC if it is reachable from every other SCC.
Example 2.16 (Continuation of Example 2.8). The strongly connected com-
ponents of the FBAS of Example 2.8 are {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6} and {7}; see Figure 1,
which also shows how the reachability relation carries over to the SCCs. Note
that the SCC {7} is the only maximal SCC and also the greatest SCC.
The following result follows from the finiteness of the set V .
Lemma 2.17. There is at least one maximal SCC. If there is only one maximal
SCC, then it is the greatest SCC. The greatest SCC is also maximal.
Let us now introduce a generalization of maximal SCCs.
Definition 2.18 (trust cluster). A set Z ⊆ V is called a trust cluster of (V, S)
if it is closed under reachability in G, i.e., if for every u ∈ Z and v ∈ V reachable
from u, also v ∈ Z.
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Lemma 2.19. A set Z ⊆ V is a trust cluster if and only if it is the union of
strongly connected components that are closed under reachability. In particular,
every maximal SCC is a trust cluster.
If a node v is in a trust cluster, then the cluster contains every node that v
trusts transitively. Moreover, we have the following basic properties.
Lemma 2.20. Let Z be a trust cluster of (V, S).
(1) (Z, S|Z) is a well-defined FBAS, where S|Z is the restriction of S to Z.
(2) Every quorum of (Z, S|Z) is also a quorum of (V, S).
(3) Z is a quorum of (V, S).
Proof. (1) Let v ∈ Z. Then every quorum slice of v is contained in Z, i.e.,
S(v) ⊆ P(Z) or, equivalently, S(v) ∈ P(P(Z)).
(2) Follows from the equality S|Z(v) = S(v) for every v ∈ Z.
(3) By (2) and the fact that Z is a quorum of (Z, S|Z).
Note that Lemma 2.20 also applies if Z is a maximal or the greatest SCC
because of Lemma 2.19.
2.3 The Stellar network
Stellar Core uses hierarchical quorum slices, but the construction is more so-
phisticated than in Example 2.10. In order to describe this construction we
need the following definition, which is based on a rooted tree.
Definition 2.21 (quorum slice definition). A quorum slice definition d =
(t,N,C) consists of a threshold t ∈ N, a set of nodes N , and a set of chil-
dren definitions C, which satisfy the following conditions:
1. Each child c ∈ C is a quorum slice definition and the recursively induced
graph is a rooted tree with root d and a finite number of vertices.
2. For two vertices (t1, N1, C1) 6= (t2, N2, C2) of the induced tree, the nodes
do not intersect, i.e., N1 ∩N2 = ∅.
3. 0 ≤ t ≤ |N |+ |C|.
For describing how a quorum slice definition is translated to quorum slices
we need the following definitions.
Definition 2.22 (k-subsets). For a finite set M and an integer k ≤ |M | we
define the k-subsets of M by Pk(M) = {N ⊆M | |N | = k} ⊆ P(M).
Definition 2.23 (product set union). For sets of sets M1, . . . ,Mk we define
their product set union by
∪×(M1, . . . ,Mk) = {m1 ∪ · · · ∪mk | (m1, . . . ,mk) ∈M1 × . . .×Mk}
⊆ P
(⋃
(M1 ∪ · · · ∪Mk)
)
.
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Definition 2.24 (quorum slice generation). Let d = (t,N,C) be a quorum slice
definition with threshold t, nodes N = {n1, . . . , nl}, and children definitions
C = {c1, . . . , cm}. The quorum slices s(d) are generated recursively with the
following set of l +m quorum slices sets
BN,C =
{
{{n1}}, . . . , {{nl}}, s(c1), . . . , s(cm)
}
by considering all t-subsets of BN,C and reducing them to a single set of quorum
slices with the product set union:
s(d) =
⋃
{∪×(M1, . . . ,Mt) | {M1, . . .Mt} ∈ Pt(BN,C)}.
Note that the above recursion is well-defined and finite because the tree has
by definition a finite number of vertices and thus leaf vertices, i.e., where the
set of children definitions is empty.
In Stellar Core a quorum slice definition is transformed with respect to the
node it is running so that the node itself is always contained in the generated
quorum slices. For a formal description we also need the following definition.
Definition 2.25 (removal of a node). Let d = (t,N,C) be a quorum slice
definition and let v be a node. The quorum slice definition with v removed is
defined by
Rv(d) =
{
(t− 1, N \ {v}, C), if v ∈ N,
(t,N, {Rv(c) | c ∈ C}), otherwise.
A Stellar Core instance running on node v that is given a quorum slice
definition d actually uses the quorum slice definition (2, {v}, {Rv(d)}).
Example 2.26 (Stellar network). The current Stellar network consists of 20
nodes in its greatest SCC (see Definition 2.15), which are run by 6 organiza-
tions4. The nodes are V = A ∪B ∪ C ∪D ∪ E ∪ F with
A = {a1, a2, a3}, B = {b1, b2, b3}, C = {c1, c2, c3},
D = {d1, d2, d3}, E = {e1, e2, e3}, F = {f1, f2, f3, f4, f5}.
The base quorum slice definition is
d = (5, ∅, {(2, A, ∅), . . . , (2, E, ∅), (3, F, ∅)}).
Thus, all quorum slices need to cover 5 organizations, and within each organi-
zation two nodes must be present (except for F , which requires three nodes to
be present). The quorum slices of v ∈ V are given by
S(v) = s(dv),
where dv = (2, {v}, {Rv(d)}) is the transformed quorum slice definition with v
moved to the top level.
4Network transitive quorumset taken from https://stellarbeat.io on Nov. 7, 2019.
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The nodes in V \ F have 3 132 quorum slices and the nodes in F have 2 673
quorum slices. A computation in Stellar Observatory shows that the FBAS
(V, S) has 114 688 quorums, and it has quorum intersection with the minimal
size of an intersection given by 4 nodes.
3 Algorithmic treatment of quorums
In this section we will first show that the quorum intersection decision problem is
NP-complete, and we will then discuss algorithms for enumerating the quorums
of a given FBAS and for deciding whether an FBAS has quorum intersection.
3.1 Checking quorum intersection is NP-complete
Lachowski [7] showed that the problem of deciding whether a given FBAS (V, S)
has two disjoint quorums (Disjoint Quorums Problem) is NP-complete. His
proof relies on a polynomial-time reduction from the NP-complete Set Splitting
Problem [5] to the Disjoint Quorums Problem. Given an instance of the Set
Splitting Problem (a family F of subsets of a given set S), his reduction builds
an instance of the Disjoint Quorums Problem such that it is only possible to
partition the set S into subsets S1, S2 in a way that all elements of F are split
by this partition, if and only if there are disjoint quorums in the constructed
FBAS.
Here we will show that the decision problem is NP-complete even if we
restrict it to the class of simple FBAS; see Definition 2.11. In order to fix the
terminology, we say that an FBAS (V, S) has quorum split if there exist two
disjoint quorums, and we let SimpleQuorumSplit be the problem to decide
whether a given simple FBAS does have quorum split.
Theorem 3.1. SimpleQuorumSplit is NP-complete.
Proof. SimpleQuorumSplit is obviously in NP because it can be checked in
polynomial time whether a set is a quorum (see Lemma 3.4 below) and, there-
fore, whether two witness sets are indeed disjoint quorums.
It remains to show that SimpleQuorumSplit is NP hard. We provide a
polynomial-time reduction of the 3-SAT [6] problem to SimpleQuorumSplit.
Consider an instance ϕ = (l11 ∨ l
2
1 ∨ l
3
1)∧· · · ∧ (l
1
m∨ l
2
m ∨ l
3
m) of 3-SAT, where the
literals lji are either variables or negated variables taken from the set x1, . . . , xr
of variables. We construct a simple FBAS (V, q, n) that has quorum split if and
only if ϕ is satisfiable. Let
V = {⋆} ∪ {ak, xk,¬xk | 1 ≤ k ≤ r} ∪ {bi, c1i , c
2
i , c
3
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m},
q(⋆) = {⋆} ∪ {bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} and n(⋆) = m+ 1, (1)
q(ak) = {ak, xk,¬xk} and n(ak) = 2 for 1 ≤ k ≤ r, (2)
q(l) =
{
l, a(k mod r)+1
}
∪
{
cji | l
j
i = l, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
}
and (3)
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n(l) = |q(l)| for 1 ≤ k ≤ r and l ∈ {xk,¬xk}, (4)
q(bi) = {bi, c1i , c
2
i , c
3
i } and n(bi) = 2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (5)
q(cji ) = {c
j
i , ⋆, a1} and n(c
j
i ) = 2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 3. (6)
Obviously, (V, q, n) is a valid simple FBAS and can be constructed in time
polynomial in the size of ϕ. It remains to show that (V, q, n) has quorum split
if and only if ϕ is satisfiable.
“⇐”: Suppose that ϕ is satisfiable and let α : {x1, . . . , xr} → {true, false}
be a variable assignment that satisfies ϕ. Let
L = {xk | α(xk) = false, 1 ≤ k ≤ r} ∪ {¬xk | α(xk) = true, 1 ≤ k ≤ r}
be the literals that are false under α. Consider the two sets
Q1 = {ak | 1 ≤ k ≤ r} ∪ L ∪ {c
j
i | l
j
i ∈ L, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3},
Q2 = {⋆} ∪ {bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪ {c
j
i | l
j
i 6∈ L, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3}.
Clearly, Q1 and Q2 are disjoint. Moreover, Q1 and Q2 are quorums of (V, q, n)
because for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ k ≤ r we have:
• xk ∈ L or ¬xk ∈ L, and hence by (2) either {ak, xk} or {ak,¬xk} is a
quorum slice of ak contained in Q1,
• q(l) ⊆ Q1 for every l ∈ L by (3), and therefore every quorum slice of l is
contained in Q1,
• if lji ∈ L, then {c
j
i , a1} is a quorum slice of c
j
i contained in Q1 by (6),
• {⋆, b1, . . . , bm} is a quorum slice of ⋆ contained in Q2 by (1),
• since α is a satisfying variable assignment for ϕ, there is a 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 such
that lji 6∈ L; then {bi, c
j
i} is a quorum slice of bi contained in Q2 by (5),
• if lji 6∈ L, then {c
j
i , ⋆} is a quorum slice of c
j
i contained in Q2 by (6).
“⇒”: Let Q1 and Q2 be disjoint quorums in (V, q, n). We construct a satis-
fying variable assignment α for ϕ. First note that for every quorum Q we have
⋆ ∈ Q or a1 ∈ Q, which follows from this list of observations:
• if ak ∈ Q, then xk ∈ Q or ¬xk ∈ Q by (2),
• if xk ∈ Q or ¬xk ∈ Q, then a(k mod r)+1 ∈ Q by (3),
• if bi ∈ Q, then c1i ∈ Q, c
2
i ∈ Q or c
3
i ∈ Q by (5),
• if cji ∈ Q, then ⋆ ∈ Q or a1 ∈ Q by (6).
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Since Q1 and Q2 are disjoint, we assume without loss of generality that a1 ∈ Q1
and ⋆ ∈ Q2. We immediately have {b1, . . . , bm} ⊆ Q2 due to (1), and from the
list of observations above we derive that {a1, . . . , ar} ⊆ Q1 and that, for every
1 ≤ k ≤ r, there is an lk ∈ {xk,¬xk} ∩Q1.
Now set α(xk) = true if lk = ¬xk, and set α(xk) = false if lk = xk. In order
to show that α satisfies ϕ, it suffices to show that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there is
a 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 such that lji is true under α. Since Q2 is a quorum and bi ∈ Q2,
there is a 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 such that cji ∈ Q2 by (5). We show that l
j
i is true under α.
Observe that lji 6∈ Q1, otherwise we would have c
j
i ∈ Q1 as Q1 is a quorum
and due to (3), contradicting cji ∈ Q2. There is a 1 ≤ k ≤ r with l
j
i = xk or
lji = ¬xk. Then, l
j
i 6= lk as lk ∈ Q1, i.e., lk = ¬xk if l
j
i = xk, and lk = xk if
lji = ¬xk. By the definition of α, l
j
i is true under α.
In the following two subsections we will discuss algorithms for enumerating
the quorums of a given FBAS and for deciding whether an FBAS has quo-
rum intersection. These algorithms are based on the work of Lachowski [7].
Lachowski describes them only on a conceptual level which gives room for in-
terpretation when implementing both algorithms. For this purpose we base
our discussion additionally on the current implementation in Stellar Core5. We
remark that the original implementation of the quorum intersection algorithm
in Stellar Core was erroneous6. The misinterpretation of Lachowski’s account
might be partially due to the fact that he merely gave a sketch of these algo-
rithms. For these reasons our main purpose here is to give an in-depth and
precise treatment of both algorithms.
3.2 Quorum enumeration
In order to describe the computational cost of the algorithms, we need to define
a measure for the size of the input. For the purposes of this definition we
distinguish between simple and general FBAS.
Definition 3.2. The slice size ‖v‖ of a node v is defined as
(1) ‖v‖ =
∑
s∈S(v) |s|, for a general FBAS (V, S), and
(2) ‖v‖ = |q(v)|, for a simple FBAS (V, q, n).
The size of an FBAS F = (V, S) or F = (V, q, n), respectively, is defined as
‖F‖ = |V |+
∑
v∈V ‖v‖.
The most fundamental operation for all algorithms discussed in this section
is to decide whether a given node has a quorum slice contained in a given subset
of V , see function containsSlice in Figure 2.
Lemma 3.3. Given U ⊆ V and v ∈ U the function containsSlice decides in
time O(‖v‖) whether v has a quorum slice contained in U .
5https://github.com/stellar/stellar-core/blob/b30a7023e6b51843ac2d3763d04ef7f0ad56ad73/src/herder/QuorumIntersectionCheckerImpl.h
6https://github.com/stellar/stellar-core/issues/2267
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Proof. Figure 2 defines the function containsSlice for general as well as for
simple FBAS. The correctness of the former version is obvious. For the correct-
ness of the latter version note that U contains a slice of v if and only if there
are n(v) nodes in q(v) that are also in U if and only if q(v)∩U has at least n(v)
elements.
The complexity follows from the fact that s ⊆ U can be decided in time
O(|s|) and that U ∩ q(v) can be computed in time O(|q(v)|).
containsSlice (for general FBAS)
Input: FBAS (V, S); U ⊆ V ; v ∈ U
Output: whether v has a quorum slice contained in U
1 for s in S(v)
2 if s ⊆ U return true
3 return false
containsSlice (for simple FBAS)
Input: simple FBAS (V, q, n); U ⊆ V ; v ∈ U
Output: whether v has a quorum slice contained in U
1 return |U ∩ q(v)| ≥ n(v)
Figure 2: Algorithm for the function containsSlice for both general and sim-
ple FBAS.
In the sequel we will not distinguish between general and simple FBAS
anymore. To this end we will refer to any FBAS simply using the variable F . We
can now use the function containsSlice to build more interesting algorithms,
see Figure 3.
Lemma 3.4. Given a nonempty set U ⊆ V the function isQuorum decides in
time O(‖F‖) whether U is a quorum of the FBAS F .
Proof. The correctness of isQuorum follows immediately from the definition of
quorums. It requires time O(
∑
v∈U ‖v‖) ≤ O(‖F‖) due to Lemma 3.3.
Clearly the union of two quorums is again a quorum. Thus, if a set U ⊆ V
contains at least one quorum, then the union of all quorums contained in U
is again a quorum. This quorum is the greatest with respect to the subset
relation among all quorums contained in U . The following lemma states that
the greatest quorum contained in a set of nodes can be computed efficiently
via the function greatestQuorum, see Figure 3. This function is slightly
more general: given two sets U ⊆ V and W ⊆ U it determines the greatest
quorum Q with W ⊆ Q ⊆ U . Note that we specify this last argument W to be
the empty set by default whenever we do not provide it explicitly when calling
greatestQuorum in other algorithms defined in the remainder of this paper.
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isQuorum
Input: FBAS F with set of nodes V ; U ⊆ V nonempty
Output: whether U is a quorum in F
1 for v in U
2 if not containsSlice(F,U, v) return false
3 return true
greatestQuorum
Input: FBAS F with set of nodes V ; U ⊆ V , W ⊆ U (∅ by default)
Output: greatest quorum Q with W ⊆ Q ⊆ U if it exists, ∅ otherwise
1 U1 ← U , i← 1
2 repeat
3 Ui+1 ← ∅
4 for v in Ui
5 if containsSlice(F,Ui, v)
6 Ui+1 ← Ui+1 ∪ {v}
7 else
8 if v ∈W return ∅
9 if Ui+1 = Ui or Ui+1 = ∅ return Ui+1
10 i← i+ 1
Figure 3: Algorithm for isQuorum and greatestQuorum.
Lemma 3.5. Given sets U ⊆ V and W ⊆ U the function greatestQuorum
decides whether there is a quorum Q with W ⊆ Q ⊆ U and, if so, computes the
greatest such quorum in time O(|V | · ‖F‖).
Proof. Observe that the i-th iteration of the loop in lines 2–10 constructs the
set Ui+1. The construction is performed in lines 3–8. Whenever we refer to one
of the sets Ui+1 in this proof, we refer to its final value that it attains after its
construction.
First observe that Ui+1 ⊆ Ui for every i by construction of Ui+1. Hence the
loop in lines 2–10 will terminate in line 9 after at most |U | ≤ |V | iterations.
By Lemma 3.3 each iteration takes time O(
∑
v∈Ui
‖v‖ + |Ui|) ≤ O(‖F‖). This
proves the time complexity of greatestQuorum.
The set returned by greatestQuorum is either empty or a quorum con-
tained in U because the condition Ui+1 = Ui on line 9 is equivalent to the
condition that containsSlice(F,Ui, v) returns true for every v ∈ Ui – com-
pare with the function isQuorum. Furthermore, if the algorithm does not
return the empty set in line 8, then it is easy to show by induction that W is
contained in every constructed Ui: (i) it is obvious for U1 and (ii) for every Ui+1
and v ∈ W the element v is added to Ui+1 in line 6. We conclude that if the
algorithm does not return the empty set, then it returns a quorum contained in
U that contains W . Conversely, whenever U does not contain a quorum that
contains W , then greatestQuorum returns the empty set as expected.
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Finally, let us consider the case that U contains a quorum that contains W .
Given an arbitrary quorum Q with W ⊆ Q ⊆ U we will show by induction that
Q ⊆ Ui for every constructed Ui and that the algorithm does not return in line 8.
This implies that greatestQuorum returns a quorum that is a superset of
Q; since Q is arbitrary, greatestQuorum returns even the greatest quorum
in U that contains W . Now let us carry out the inductive proof. Trivially,
Q ⊆ U1 = U . Let i with Q ⊆ Ui. For every v ∈ Q there is a quorum slice
of v contained in Q and therefore also in Ui – hence, v ∈ Ui+1. We conclude
Q ⊆ Ui+1.
Let us now consider an algorithm for enumerating all quorums of an FBAS.
Note that every such algorithm has worst-case time complexity of at least
O(2|V |) because there can be exponentially many quorums. In fact, there are
FBAS such that every nonempty subset of V is a quorum; see Example 2.5.
We will show that quorums can be enumerated with polynomial-time delay
using the function enumerateQuorums in Figure 4. This result is originally
due to Lachowski [7], but the algorithm we present here uses a more efficient
approach than the one described in his proof of [7, Proposition 2].
Lemma 3.6. The function enumerateQuorums enumerates all quorums of
an FBAS with time delay O(|V |2 · ‖F‖).
Proof. It suffices to show that for every U ⊆ V and R ⊆ V \ U , the function
call traverseQuorums(F,U,R) enumerates all quorums Q of F such that
U ⊆ Q ⊆ U ∪R with time delay O(|V |2 · ‖F‖).
First let us prove the correctness of the algorithm by strong induction on
|R|. Let U ⊆ V and R ⊆ V \U and suppose that the correctness of traverse-
Quorums holds for every U ′ and R′ disjoint from U ′ with |R′| < |R|.
Consider the case that the function call returns early in line 2 and therefore
does not enumerate any quorums. Then Q = ∅; by Lemma 3.5 this implies that
U ∪R does not contain any quorums that are supersets of U and therefore there
are no quorums to enumerate – the function behaves correctly.
Now consider the case that the algorithm does not return early in line 2.
Then Q is a quorum with U ⊆ Q ⊆ U ∪R and line 3 will correctly output this
quorum. All remaining quorums Q′ with U ⊆ Q′ ⊆ U ∪R will be proper subsets
of Q as Q is the greatest quorum contained in U ∪ R. Therefore, in order to
enumerate all remaining quorums it is sufficient to consider candidates in the
set {Q′ | U ⊆ Q′ ⊂ Q}. Suppose that the set Q \ U has n elements and that
they are enumerated in the order v1, . . . , vn in the loop in lines 5 to 7. Observe
that we can decompose the set {Q′ | U ⊆ Q′ ⊂ Q} disjointly as follows:
{Q′ | U ⊆ Q′ ⊂ Q} =
{
Q′ | U ⊆ Q′ ⊆ Q \ {v1}
}
∪
{
Q′ | U ∪ {v1} ⊆ Q
′ ⊆ Q \ {v2}
}
∪ · · · ∪
{
Q′ | U ∪ {v1, . . . , vn−1} ⊆ Q
′ ⊆ Q \ {vn}
}
=
⋃n
i=1
{
Q′ | U ∪ {v1, . . . , vi−1} ⊆ Q
′ ⊆ Q \ {vi}
}
. (7)
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The i-th component of this union stands for all sets Q′ that contain the nodes
v1, . . . , vi−1, but not the node vi. Thus, (7) is a disjoint union. Let Wi be the
value of W at the beginning of the i-th iteration of the loop in lines 5 to 7.
Clearly, Wi = {vi, . . . , vn}. Then the above decomposition can be written as
{Q′ | U ⊆ Q′ ⊂ Q} =
⋃n
i=1
{
Q′ | Q \Wi ⊆ Q
′ ⊆ Q \ {vi}
}
. (8)
Together with the induction hypothesis this proves the correctness of the algo-
rithm because the i-th call to traverseQuorums in line 6 will enumerate the
quorums in the i-the component of the right-hand side of (8).
For the proof of the time complexity note that every call to the function
traverseQuorums will either return early or output its first quorum after
time O(|V | · ‖F‖) by Lemma 3.5. If it outputs a quorum, then it will make at
most |V | subsequent recursive calls to traverseQuorums. Therefore the call
to traverseQuorums will either quit without outputting any other quorums,
or it will output the next quorum after at most O(|V |2 · ‖F‖) steps.
enumerateQuorums
Input: FBAS F with set of nodes V
Output: enumerate all quorums of F
1 traverseQuorums(F, ∅, V )
traverseQuorums
Input: FBAS F with set of nodes V ; U ⊆ V ; R ⊆ V \ U
Output: enumerate all quorums Q of F with U ⊆ Q ⊆ U ∪R
1 Q← greatestQuorum(F,U ∪R,U)
2 if Q = ∅ return
3 output Q
4 W ← Q \ U
5 for v in Q \ U
6 traverseQuorums(F,Q \W,W \ {v})
7 W ←W \ {v}
Figure 4: Algorithm for enumerateQuorums.
Example 3.7. In this experiment we study the computation time of the enu-
merateQuorums algorithm (see Figure 4) implemented in Stellar Observatory
in comparison with the number of quorums of a sequence of FBAS that are
constructed similarly to the current maximal SCC of the Stellar network; see
Example 2.26. We consider n organizations A1, . . . , An with 3 nodes each, and
define an FBAS (V, S) by V = A1 ∪ · · · ∪ An, so that |V | = 3n, and quorum
slices
S(v) = s(dv),
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where dv = (2, {v}, {Rv(d)}) and d = (t, ∅, {(2, A1, ∅), . . . , (2, An, ∅)}) for a
t ∈ N. Essentially, t organizations are required on the root level and then 2
nodes are required within each organization. Analogous to the Stellar network
(cf. Example 2.26), we transform the quorum slice definition for each node v ∈ V
to dv by moving v to the root level and removing it from its original position
with Rv; see Definition 2.25.
We consider the root level thresholds t = n − 1 and t = ⌊ 23n⌋+ 1. In both
cases the number of quorums as well as the computation time of the enumer-
ateQuorums algorithm grow exponentially with n; see the dashed line ( )
and the solid line ( ) in Figure 5, respectively. The code for reproducing the
results is available on GitHub7.
3.3 Quorum intersection
We have shown in Section 3.1 that the problem to decide whether a given FBAS
has quorum intersection is NP-complete. The brute-force approach to solve this
problem is to first enumerate all quorums (see the previous section), and then
to compare all pairs of quorums. This method has complexity 2O(|V |) as the
number of quorums can be exponential in the number of nodes.
In this section we will discuss an algorithm to decide quorum intersection
that still has exponential time complexity but that is drastically more efficient
than the brute-force approach. This algorithm is due to Lachowski [7] and is
based on the following key ideas:
(1) Preprocessing the given FBAS can considerably reduce its size before enu-
merating the quorums.
(2) Instead of enumerating all quorums it is sufficient to enumerate only min-
imal quorums up to a certain size.
3.3.1 Strongly connected components
In this section we will make use of the trust graph as defined in Definition 2.13.
In the following lemma we use the notation S|C , which is the restriction of S to
C; see Lemma 2.20.
Lemma 3.8. (1) If (V, S) has quorum intersection, then the greatest SCC of
its trust graph exists.
(2) Let Q ⊆ V be a quorum of (V, S). Then there is an SCC D such that
D ∩Q is a quorum of (V, S).
(3) If C is the greatest SCC and no other SCC contains a quorum of (V, S),
then (C, S|C) has quorum intersection if and only if (V, S) has quorum
intersection.
7https://github.com/andrenarchy/stellar-experiments
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Figure 5: Computation time of enumerateQuorums in seconds ( ) and
number of quorums ( ) for the FBAS described in Example 3.7 consisting of n
organizations with 3 nodes each. Note that the y-axes are scaled logarithmically.
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Proof. (1) If there are distinct maximal SCC, then there are disjoint quorums
due to Lemma 2.20(3). Hence, there is only one maximal SCC and it is even
the greatest SCC by Lemma 2.17.
(2) Let D be the set of all SCCs that intersect Q. Then D is nonempty as Q
is nonempty. There is at least one SCC D ∈ D such that no other SCC in D is
reachable from D. We show that D ∩Q is a quorum of (V, S). Let v ∈ D ∩Q.
Then there is a slice s ∈ S(v) with s ⊆ Q. Suppose that s 6⊆ D and let u ∈ s\D.
Thus, u is in an SCC D′ different from D. Clearly, D′ ∈ D because u ∈ s ⊆ Q.
It follows that D′ is reachable from D, contrary to the construction of D. Thus,
our assumption s 6⊆ D was wrong. Since s ⊆ D ∩Q, the set D ∩Q is a quorum
of (V, S).
(3) “⇒”: Suppose that (V, S) has disjoint quorums Q1 and Q2. Because of
(2), there are SCCs D1 and D2 such that D1 ∩ Q1 and D2 ∩ Q2 are quorums
of (V, S). Then D1 = D2 = C by assumption. The definition of (C, S|C)
immediately implies that C ∩Q1 and C ∩Q2 are not just quorums of (V, S) but
also of (C, S|C). Therefore (C, S|C) does not have quorum intersection.
“⇐”: If Q1 and Q2 are disjoint quorums of (C, S|C), then they are also
disjoint quorums of (V, S) by Lemma 2.20(2).
Using the results of Lemma 3.8 we can preprocess the FBAS and reduce its
size before running the actual algorithm to decide quorum intersection. To this
end we determine the strongly connected components of the trust graph using,
e.g., Tarjan’s algorithm [17]. If there is no greatest SCC, then Lemma 3.8(1)
implies that there are disjoint quorums. Next, we can check whether any of
the SCCs different from the greatest SCC C contain a quorum by using the
function greatestQuorum; see Lemma 3.5. If this is the case, then there are
disjoint quorums because the greatest SCC is itself a quorum by Lemma 2.20(3).
Otherwise, Lemma 3.8(3) allows to reduce the quorum intersection decision to
the FBAS (C, S|C).
3.3.2 Minimal quorums
Instead of enumerating all quorums of (V, S) and comparing them pairwise,
we can instead enumerate all minimal quorums Q up to size |V |/2 and check
whether V \ Q contains a quorum; see the function quorumIntersection in
Figure 6. For now assume that traverseMinQuorums(F, ∅, V ) enumerates all
minimal quorums up to size |V |/2; we will prove its correctness in Lemma 3.10.
Lemma 3.9. The function quorumIntersection decides whether F has quo-
rum intersection and returns a pair of disjoint quorums if it does not.
Proof. Suppose that quorumIntersection returns a pair (Q,Q′). Thus Q
is a minimal quorum and Q′ = greatestQuorum(F, V \ Q) 6= ∅. Then by
Lemma 3.5, Q′ is a quorum which is obviously disjoint from Q. Hence, (V, S)
does not have quorum intersection.
Now suppose that (V, S) does not have quorum intersection. We will prove
that quorumIntersection does not return true but two disjoint quorums in-
stead. There are two disjoint quorums Q1 and Q2. Without loss of generality,
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quorumIntersection
Input: FBAS F with set of nodes V
Output: true if F has quorum intersection; otherwise two disjoint quorums
1 for Q in traverseMinQuorums(F, ∅, V )
2 Q′ ← greatestQuorum(F, V \Q)
3 if Q′ 6= ∅ return (Q,Q′)
4 return true
traverseMinQuorums
Input: FBAS F with set of nodes V ; U ⊆ V ; R ⊆ V \ U
Output: enumerate all minimal quorums Q of F with
U ⊆ Q ⊆ U ∪R and |Q| ≤ |V |/2
1 if |U | > |V |/2 return
2 Q = greatestQuorum(F,U)
3 if Q 6= ∅
4 if U = Q and not containsProperSubQuorum(F,U)
5 output U
6 else
7 if R 6= ∅ and greatestQuorum(F,U ∪R,U) 6= ∅
8 v ← pick from R
9 traverseMinQuorums(F,U,R \ {v})
10 traverseMinQuorums(F,U ∪ {v}, R \ {v})
containsProperSubQuorum
Input: FBAS F with set of nodes V ; U ⊆ V
Output: whether there is a quorum Q ( U
1 for v in U
2 if greatestQuorum(F,U \ {v}) 6= ∅ return true
3 return false
Figure 6: Algorithm for quorumIntersection.
|Q1| ≤ |Q2|, which implies |Q1| ≤ |V |/2. There is a minimal quorum Q in
Q1, possibly Q1 itself. Clearly, Q will be one of the quorums enumerated by
traverseMinQuorums(F, ∅, V ) in line 1. Since Q2 is a quorum contained in
V \Q, the set Q′ computed in line 2 will not be empty and therefore quoru-
mIntersection will not return true.
Now let us prove the correctness of traverseMinQuorums; see Figure 6.
We remark that line 8 of traverseMinQuorums nondeterministically picks
an element from R. In practice we would use some heuristics to decide what
element to pick next in order to minimize the run-time. These details shall not
concern us in the present paper.
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Lemma 3.10. Given two sets U ⊆ V and R ⊆ V \ U , the function invocation
traverseMinQuorums(F,U,R) enumerates every minimal quorum Q of F
such that U ⊆ Q ⊆ U ∪R and |Q| ≤ |V |/2. Furthermore, every such quorum is
enumerated exactly once.
Proof. We give a proof by induction over |R|. Before we proceed to the proof
of the induction base and induction step, we will look at two special cases first.
First consider the case |U | > |V |/2. Then there are no sets Q with U ⊆
Q ⊆ U ∪R and |Q| ≤ |V |/2. Moreover, traverseMinQuorums returns early
in line 1 and, thus, does not enumerate any sets; i.e., the function behaves
correctly.
Next suppose that |U | ≤ |V |/2 and that U contains a quorum. In this case
the function call will branch into line 4 because Q is nonempty by Lemma 3.5.
Observe that the function containsProperSubQuorum defined in Figure 6
correctly decides whether a set U of nodes contains a proper subset that is a
quorum. We conclude that the function traverseMinQuorums will output
U in line 5 if and only if U itself is a quorum (i.e., U = Q) and it is a minimal
quorum. This is obviously correct behavior. The call to traverseMinQuo-
rums will then finish and not enumerate any other quorum. This is also correct
because there cannot be any other minimal quorum Q with U ⊆ Q.
Let us now proceed to the actual inductive proof. It is sufficient to consider
the case that |U | ≤ |V |/2 and that U does not contain a quorum – the latter
condition implies that U itself is not a quorum. This case also implies that
traverseMinQuorums branches into line 7.
For the base case |R| = 0 we have R = ∅ and traverseMinQuorums will
not branch into line 8, i.e., it does not enumerate any sets. This is correct
behavior as the only set Q satisfying U ⊆ Q ⊆ U ∪ R is Q = U and it is not a
quorum.
For the induction step let |R| > 0. Then R 6= ∅. We distinguish two cases.
If greatestQuorum(F,U ∪ R,U) = ∅, then (i) there is no quorum Q with
U ⊆ Q ⊆ U ∪ R by Lemma 3.5 and (ii) traverseMinQuorums does not
branch into line 8 and does not enumerate any quorums; hence traverseM-
inQuorums behaves correctly. If greatestQuorum(F,U ∪ R,U) 6= ∅, then
traverseMinQuorums branches into line 8, picks a node v from R and makes
two recursive calls to traverseMinQuorums. By induction, the first call enu-
merates all minimal quorums Q with U ⊆ Q ⊆ U ∪R that do not contain v and
the second call all those minimal quorums that do contain v.
Example 3.11. In this experiment we study the computation time of the quo-
rumIntersection algorithm (see Figure 6) implemented in Stellar Observa-
tory for the same sequence of FBAS as in Example 3.7. All FBAS of this
form with n > 2 have quorum intersection, and the computation time of the
quorumIntersection algorithm grows exponentially; see Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Computation time of quorumIntersection in seconds for the FBAS
described in Example 3.7 consisting of n organizations with 3 nodes each. Note
that the y-axes are scaled logarithmically.
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4 Intactness
A node v ∈ V can be either well-behaved or ill-behaved8 . This is a local prop-
erty, which is independent of the quorum function S, and which other nodes
cannot control. An important question is whether ill-behaved nodes can nega-
tively impact other (well-behaved) nodes. If this happens, these other nodes are
befouled by the ill-behaved nodes. This intuitive idea will be made precise in
Definitions 4.1, 4.5 and 4.7 below, which correspond to the original development
of Mazières [13, p. 9–10]:
Definition 4.1 (FBAS without D). Let (V, S) be an FBAS and let D ⊆ V .
The FBAS without D is defined by (V, S)D = (V \D,SD), where
SD(v) = {s \D | s ∈ S(v)} for all v ∈ V \D.
Thus, forming (V, S)D amounts to deleting the nodes in D from V and from
all quorum slices. The next result of Mazières will be useful in our discussion
below.
Lemma 4.2 (Theorem 1 in [13]). Let Q ⊆ V be a quorum in (V, S) and let
D ⊆ V . If Q \D 6= ∅, then Q \D is a quorum in (V, S)D.
The following two corollaries are an immediate consequence of Definition 4.1.
The second one is a consequence of Lemma 2.20(2).
Corollary 4.3. Let D ⊆ V and E ⊆ V \D. Then ((V, S)D)E = (V, S)D∪E.
Corollary 4.4. Let Z be a trust cluster of (V, S). Then (V, S)V \Z = (Z, S|Z)
and every quorum of (V, S)V \Z is also a quorum of (V, S).
The following notion of dispensible sets (DSets) is an important stepping
stone for the definition of intactness.
Definition 4.5 (DSet). Let (V, S) be an FBAS. A set D ⊆ V is a dispensible
set or DSet, when
• (V, S)D has quorum intersection, and
• either V \D is a quorum in (V, S) or D = V .
By this definition, D = V is always a DSet, since (V, S)V = (∅, SD) with
SD : ∅ → {{∅}}, consistently with Definition 2.1, and this FBAS trivially has
quorum intersection. Whenever an FBAS (V, S) has quorum intersection, D = ∅
is a DSet. An extreme case arises when S(v) = {V } for all v ∈ V , since then ∅
and V are the only DSets.
8Alternative terms used in this context, which mean the same as ill-behaved, are faulty
(see, e.g., [9, Section 3.1]) and Byzantine (see, e.g. [10, Definition 1]).
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Example 4.6. Consider the FBAS (V, S) from Example 2.8. Since this FBAS
has quorum intersection, ∅ and V are DSets. For every DSet D 6= ∅ it is
necessary that V \D is a quorum in (V, S). The only candidates are {1, 2, 3},
{4, 5, 6}, and V \{7}. For each of these sets we see that the corresponding FBAS
(V, S)D indeed has quorum intersection, and hence the DSets of (V, S) are given
by
∅, {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, V \ {7}, V.
We can now formalize the intuitive idea described at the beginning of this
section.
Definition 4.7 (intact and befouled). LetB ⊆ V be the set of ill-behaved nodes
in the FBAS (V, S). A node v is called B-intact when there exists a single DSet
D which contains all ill-behaved nodes but not v, i.e., B ⊆ D ⊆ V \ {v}. If B is
obvious from the context, then we just say that v is intact instead of B-intact.
If v is not intact, it is called befouled.
Note that if a node v is intact, then the definition immediately implies that
it is well-behaved. Conversely, if v is ill-behaved, then it is befouled. The
interesting object of study are the well-behaved nodes that are befouled.
We have shown in Theorem 3.1 that the problem SimpleQuorumSplit is
NP-complete. Since the problem to decide whether a given set D ⊆ V is a DSet
involves the problem to decide whether (V, S)D has quorum intersection, the
DSet decision problem is computationally at least as hard. We will deal with
the algorithmic treatment of intactness in Section 5 below.
4.1 Intact nodes in symmetric simple FBAS
While the computation of quorums and DSets in general is computationally
challenging, the quorums of a symmetric simple FBAS can be completely char-
acterized, see Lemma 2.12. The following result shows that a simple character-
ization also exists for DSets of symmetric simple FBAS.
Lemma 4.8. Let (V, k) be a symmetric simple FBAS, and let D ⊆ V . Then the
set of all quorums of (V, k)D is given by
{
Q ⊆ V \D | |Q| ≥ max{1, k− |D|}
}
.
Moreover, (V, k)D has quorum intersection if and only if max{1, k − |D|} >
(|V | − |D|)/2.
Proof. If Q ⊆ V \ D is any set with |Q| < max{1, k − |D|} then either Q is
empty and hence not a quorum, or 1 ≤ |Q| < k − |D|. Let v ∈ Q, and let s be
any quorum slice of v in (V, k). From |s| = k we obtain |s \D| ≥ |s| − |D| =
k−|D| > |Q|, which shows that s\D is not contained in Q, and hence Q cannot
be a quorum.
Now let Q ⊆ V \D with |Q| ≥ max{1, k−|D|}; then Q is nonempty. Consider
a node v ∈ Q.
(i) If |D| > k − 1, then there exist distinct d1, . . . , dk−1 ∈ D. Then {v} ∪
{d1, . . . , dk−1} is a quorum slice of v in (V, k) and, thus, {v} is a quorum slice
of v in (V, k)D that is contained in Q.
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(ii) If |D| ≤ k−1, then |Q| ≥ k−|D| implies that there exist distinct elements
q1, . . . , qk−|D|−1 ∈ Q \ {v}. Then {v} ∪ {q1, . . . , qk−|D|−1} ∪D is a quorum slice
of v in (V, k), and thus {v}∪{q1, . . . , qk−|D|−1} is a quorum slice of v in (V, k)D
that is contained in Q.
This concludes the proof that Q is a quorum of (V, k)D. The statement that
(V, k)D has quorum intersection if and only if max{1, k − |D|} > (|V | − |D|)/2
can be proved similarly to Lemma 2.12.
We remark that deleting nodes from a symmetric simple FBAS according to
Definition 4.1 does not preserve the property to be symmetric and simple. To
show this consider the example symmetric simple FBAS (V, k) with V = {a, b, c}
and k = 2. Let D = {c}. Then the quorum slices of a in (V, k) are {a, b} and
{a, c} and the quorum slices of a in (V, k)D are {a, b} and {a}. These last two
quorum slices have different sizes so that we can conclude that (V, k)D is not
simple and therefore not symmetric.
Using the Lemmas 4.8 and 2.12 we now characterize the DSets of a simple
symmetric FBAS.
Lemma 4.9. Let (V, k) be a symmetric simple FBAS. A set D ⊆ V is a DSet
if and only if one of the following holds:
(1) D = V , or
(2) k = 1 and |D| = |V | − 1, or
(3) |D| ≤ min{|V | − k, 2k − |V | − 1}.
Proof. By definition, D is a DSet if and only if
(i) D = V or
(ii) max{1, k− |D|} > (|V | − |D|)/2, i.e., (V, k)D has quorum intersection (cf.
Lemma 4.8) and
|V | − |D| ≥ k, i.e., V \D is a quorum in (V, k) (cf. Lemma 2.12).
The equivalence is now shown by the following implications:
“(ii) ⇒ (1), (2) or (3)”: If max{1, k − |D|} > (|V | − |D|)/2, then either
(a) 1 > (|V | − |D|)/2, or (b) k − |D| > (|V | − |D|)/2. In case (a) we have
either V = D and hence statement (1), or |V | − |D| = 1, which together with
|V | − |D| ≥ k yields (2). In case (b) we have |D| < 2k − |V |, which together
with |D| ≤ |V | − k yields (3).
“(2) or (3) ⇒ (ii)”: Clearly, (2) implies (ii). Moreover, (3) yields |D| ≤
|V | − k and hence |V | − |D| ≥ k, as well as |D| ≤ 2k − |V | − 1 or equivalently
k − |D| > (|V | − |D|)/2, so that we again obtain (ii).
Lemma 4.9 shows that if (V, k) is a symmetric simple FBAS with 1 < k = |V |
or 1 < k ≤ (|V |+1)/2, then (V, k) has only the trivial DSets D = V and possibly
D = ∅.
We say that an FBAS (V, S) is resilient againstm ≥ 0 ill-behaved nodes if no
well-behaved node becomes befouled whenever there are at most m ill-behaved
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nodes. We now ask about the minimum size of V such that for a suitable k there
is a symmetric simple FBAS (V, k) that is resilient against m ill-behaved nodes.
We only want to consider FBAS that have quorum intersection and therefore
we require k > |V |/2 by Lemma 2.12. In particular, k > 1 if we exclude trivial
FBAS.
We know that a node v is intact when all ill-behaved nodes (at most m)
are contained in a single DSet that does not contain v. By Lemma 4.9, the
relevant DSets of (V, k) are given by all sets D ⊆ V \ {v} which satisfy m ≤
|D| ≤ min{|V | − k, 2k − |V | − 1}, and hence |V | and k must satisfy m ≤
min{|V | − k, 2k − |V | − 1}. Maximizing the right hand side over k by equating
the two expressions yields k = 2|V |/3 + 1/3, and then m ≤ |V | − k leads to
|V | ≥ 3m+ 1. Thus, the minimum number of nodes is |V | = 3m + 1, and the
corresponding constant is k = 2(3m+ 1)/3 + 1/3 = 2m+ 1.
We thus have shown the following result, which is consistent with traditional
Byzantine fault tolerance; see, e.g., [2], [1, Theorem 4], and Example 2.7 above.
Theorem 4.10. The minimum number of nodes of a symmetric simple FBAS
(V, k) that is resilient against (at most) m ill-behaved nodes is 3m+1, and this
FBAS has constant k = 2m+ 1.
4.2 Comparison of intactness definitions
In the recent publications [9, 10], quorums and intactness are defined differently
from [13], and in this subsection we will compare both variants. Let us first give
an intuition for the main differences:
• In the definitions of [13], which we adopted in this paper, the main notions
are introduced in the following order: First, FBAS, quorums, quorum
intersection, and DSets are defined without any reference to ill-behaved
nodes. Then one postulates a set of ill-behaved nodes and introduces the
concept of an intact node, which depends on the set of ill-behaved nodes.
• In [9, 10], the set of intact nodes is directly “baked into” an FBAS, i.e., in
these papers FBAS are richer structures that already define their intact
nodes. Then quorums and quorum intersection directly incorporate the
set of intact nodes into their definition. Finally, the notion of intact sets
is introduced.
The advantage of the first paradigm is that FBAS can be viewed as structures
agnostic to the set of ill-behaved nodes (which is usually unknown in practice).
An advantage of the second paradigm is its simplicity – it does not require
definitions of DSets or FBAS of the form (V, S)D.
In order to mathematically compare the two paradigms, we need the follow-
ing definition.
Definition 4.11 (B-quorum and B-intact set). Let (V, S) be an FBAS and
B ⊆ V . A B-quorum is a nonempty set Q ⊆ V such that for every v ∈ Q \ B
there is a quorum slice s ∈ S(v) with s ⊆ Q. A subset U ⊆ V \ B is called a
B-intact set if
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• U is a B-quorum or U = ∅,
• for all B-quorums Q, Q′ that intersect U , also Q ∩Q′ intersects U .
Note that in Definition 4.7 we have defined B-intact nodes, whereas Defi-
nition 4.11 introduces B-intact sets (as in [9, Section 3.1] and [10, Section 5]).
Intuitively, we expect that a node is B-intact if and only if it is contained in
a B-intact set. We will show that this is actually not the case, and that the
former property is strictly stronger than the latter.
For the following discussion we fix a set B ⊆ V , the set of ill-behaved nodes.
Lemma 4.12. If a node v is B-intact, then it is contained in a B-intact set.
Proof. Let us first prove the following auxiliary statement:
(A) Let D ⊆ V contain B and let Q be a B-quorum with Q 6⊆ D. Then Q \D
is a quorum in (V, S)D.
Obviously, Q\D is nonempty. Let v ∈ Q\D. Then in particular v 6∈ B. Hence,
there is an s ∈ S(v) with s ⊆ Q and, therefore, s \D ⊆ Q \ D. We conclude
that Q \D is a quorum in (V, S)D. This concludes the proof of Statement (A).
Now let us proceed with the proof of this lemma. Let v be B-intact. Then
there is DSet D containing B but not v. Let U = V \ D. We will show that
U is a B-intact set. Clearly, U is a quorum because U is nonempty and due to
the definition of D. Then U is also a B-quorum. Let Q,Q′ be B-quorums that
intersect U . By Statement (A), Q\D and Q′ \D are quorums in (V, S)D. Since
D is a DSet we obtain that ∅ 6= (Q \D) ∩ (Q′ \D) = (Q ∩Q′) \D, i.e., Q ∩Q′
intersect U .
The following example shows that the converse of Lemma 4.12 does not
hold in general, i.e., we cannot conclude that every member of a B-intact set is
B-intact itself.
Example 4.13. Let V = {a, b, c, d},
S(a) = {{a, b}}, S(b) = {{a, b, c, d}},
S(c) = {{b, c}, {c, d}}, S(d) = {{b, d}, {c, d}},
and let B = {a}. Then there are two quorums, {c, d} and {a, b, c, d}, and four
B-quorums, {a}, {a, c, d}, {c, d} and {a, b, c, d}, so that {c, d} is a B-intact set.
On the other hand, the only DSet that contains B is V itself, and hence no
node in V is B-intact. (Observe that {a, b} is not a DSet as (V, S){a,b} has the
quorums {c} and {d} and therefore has no quorum intersection.)
We will now introduce an FBAS property under which the converse of
Lemma 4.12 is guaranteed to hold.
Definition 4.14 (subslice property). We say that (V, S) has the B-subslice
property if for every v ∈ V \B, sv ∈ S(v) and u ∈ sv \B there is some su ∈ S(u)
with su ⊆ sv.
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We remark that the B-subslice property reminds of the main property of
Personal Byzantine Quorum Systems [10, Property 1]. It is easy to see that the
B-subslice property holds for symmetric simple FBAS for every setB. Moreover,
this property holds for many example FBAS presented in this paper such as
Examples 2.5, 2.6, 2.8 and 2.10. More interestingly, it is easy to show that also
the greatest SCC of the Stellar network (see Example 2.26) has the B-subslice
property for every set B of ill-behaved nodes.
Theorem 4.15. Let (V, S) have the B-subslice property and let v ∈ V . Then
the following statements are equivalent:
(1) v is B-intact.
(2) v is contained in a B-intact set.
Proof. The direction (1) ⇒ (2) follows from Lemma 4.12.
Let us now prove the direction (2) ⇒ (1) and suppose that v is contained in
a B-intact set U . It suffices to show that D = V \U is a DSet because v ∈ U and
U ∩B = ∅. By the last property, if U is a B-quorum, then it is also a quorum.
Hence, the only non-trivial property that we need to show is that (V, S)D has
quorum intersection. Let Q,Q′ be quorums in (V, S)D. We will show that there
are B-quorums P , P ′ with P \ D = Q and P ′ \ D = Q′. We only prove that
there is such a set P ; the proof for the existence of P ′ follows by symmetry.
For every v ∈ Q there is a slice sv ∈ S(v) such that sv \ D ⊆ Q. Let
P =
⋃
v∈Q sv. We will show that (i) P is a B-quorum and that (ii) P \D = Q.
(i) Let u ∈ P\B. Then there is some v ∈ Q with u ∈ sv. Since v ∈ Q ⊆ V \D,
we have v 6∈ B and u 6∈ B. Then there is some su ∈ S(u) with su ⊆ sv ⊆ P by
the B-subslice property.
(ii) P \D =
⋃
v∈Q sv \D = Q because v ∈ sv \D ⊆ Q for every v ∈ Q.
This concludes the proof for the existence of P and P ′. Since Q and Q′
are contained in U and nonempty, the sets P and P ′ intersect U . Thus, also
P ∩ P ′ intersects U because U is a B-intact set. Thus, ∅ 6= (P ∩ P ′) ∩ U =
(P ∩ P ′) \ D = (P \ D) ∩ (P ′ \ D) = Q ∩ Q′. We conclude that (V, S)D has
quorum intersection.
5 Algorithmic treatment of intactness
Let us now study the problem to algorithmically determine the set of B-intact
nodes given a setB of ill-behaved nodes. We point out that in a real-life situation
one does usually not know the set B and would not be able to apply such an
algorithm. However, it is useful for analyzing a given FBAS and to simulate
certain failure and attack scenarios.
The techniques we use in this section are based on methods and algorithms
developed in Section 3. Throughout this section we will assume that we only
consider FBAS (V, S) that have quorum intersection.
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5.1 Strongly connected components
In this section we revisit the trust graph of the FBAS and show how it affects
the intactness of nodes in an FBAS. We will see that analyzing the structure of
the SCCs of the trust graph allows us to prune major parts of the FBAS when
determining intactness of nodes.
Let us first present two rather technical properties about trust clusters and
DSets. The first one ensures that every DSet still behaves like a DSet within a
trust cluster. The second one states that every DSet within a trust cluster can
be extended to a DSet for the whole FBAS.
Lemma 5.1. Let Z be a trust cluster of (V, S) and let D be a DSet of (V, S).
Then D ∩ Z is a DSet of (Z, S|Z).
Proof. By Corollary 4.4 (Z, S|Z) = (V, S)V \Z . Thus, we need to show that
(1) ((V, S)V \Z)D∩Z has quorum intersection.
(2) Z \ (D ∩ Z) is a quorum in (V, S)V \Z or D ∩ Z = Z.
(1) The equality (V \Z)∪ (D ∩Z) = D ∪ ((V \D) \ (Z \D)) and Corollary 4.3
imply ((V, S)V \Z)D∩Z = ((V, S)D)(V \D)\(Z\D). Let us refer to this FBAS as
F ′. It is straightforward to show that Z \D is a trust cluster of (V, S)D. Then
Corollary 4.4 implies that every quorum of F ′ is also a quorum of (V, S)D. Thus,
F ′ has quorum intersection because (V, S)D does have quorum intersection.
(2) We will show the equivalent statement that Z\D is a quorum in (V, S)V \Z
or Z ⊆ D. Since D is a DSet we have either that V \D is a quorum in (V, S)
or that D = V . We are done in the latter case as it implies Z ⊆ D. Consider
the former case and suppose that Z 6⊆ D. We will show that Z \D is a quorum
in (V, S)V \Z . From Z 6⊆ D we obtain (V \D) \ (V \ Z) 6= ∅. Then Lemma 4.2
yields that (V \D) \ (V \ Z) = Z \D is a quorum in (V, S)V \Z .
Lemma 5.2. Let Z be a trust cluster of (V, S) and let D be a DSet of (Z, S|Z).
Then D ∪ (V \ Z) is a DSet of (V, S).
Proof. Our assumption is equivalent to the statement that D is a DSet of
(V, S)V \Z due to Corollary 4.4. We need to show that
(1) (V, S)D∪(V \Z) has quorum intersection.
(2) V \ (D ∪ (V \ Z)) is a quorum in (V, S) or D ∪ (V \ Z) = V .
Statement (1) follows from Corollary 4.3 and the fact that ((V, S)V \Z)D has
quorum intersection, which is a consequence of our assumption. Next let us
prove Statement (2). We have that Z \D is a quorum in (V, S)V \Z or D = Z.
In the former case Corollary 4.4 yields that V \ (D ∪ (V \ Z)) = Z \ D is a
quorum in (V, S). The latter case clearly implies D ∪ (V \ Z) = V .
We can now combine the previous two lemmas to the following result.
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Theorem 5.3. Let Z be a trust cluster, v ∈ Z and B ⊆ V . The node v is
B-intact in (V, S) if and only if v is (B ∩ Z)-intact in (Z, S|Z).
Proof. “⇒”: Let v be B-intact in (V, S). Then there is a DSet D of (V, S) with
B ⊆ D ⊆ V \ {v}. Lemma 5.1 yields that D ∩ Z is a DSet of (Z, S|Z). Clearly,
B ∩ Z ⊆ D ∩ Z ⊆ Z \ {v}, which proves that v is (B ∩ Z)-intact in (Z, S|Z).
“⇐”: Let v be (B∩Z)-intact in (Z, S|Z). Then there is a DSet D of (Z, S|Z)
with B∩Z ⊆ D ⊆ Z\{v}. Lemma 5.2 implies thatD∪(V \Z) is a DSet of (V, S).
Note that B ⊆ (B ∩Z)∪ (V \Z) ⊆ D∪ (V \Z) ⊆ (Z \ {v})∪ (V \Z) = V \ {v}
and therefore, v is B-intact in (V, S).
The following corollary uses Lemma 2.19.
Corollary 5.4. Let C be the greatest SCC and B ⊆ V . Let I be the set of
B-intact nodes of (V, S). Then I ∩ C is the set of (B ∩ C)-intact nodes of
(C, S|C).
There are two ways to interpret the previous theorem and corollary. First,
whether nodes inside a trust cluster are intact or befouled merely depends on
the ill-behaved nodes inside the trust cluster. The ill-behaved nodes outside
the trust cluster have no influence on this. Second, if we are only interested to
know what nodes inside a specific trust cluster Z are intact, we can apply the
algorithm that we present below to the smaller FBAS (Z, S|Z) instead. This is
particularly meaningful when one is only interested in determining what nodes
in the greatest SCC are intact. It also shows that the nodes in the greatest SCC
have the highest importance in an FBAS – they can influence the intactness of
all other nodes but their own intactness cannot be influenced by nodes outside
the SCC.
5.2 The intactness algorithm
The algorithm to compute the set of B-intact nodes is shown in Figure 8. Before
we are going to prove its correctness, we want to point out that in a naive
implementation of the expression quorumIntersection(FV \Q) on line 4 one
would need to construct FV \Q first. This can be challenging as usually FV \Q is
not a simple FBAS even if F is a simple FBAS; see the remark after Lemma 4.8.
Then the construction of FV \Q would lead to an exponential blowup; cf. our
concept of size of general and simple FBAS in Definition 3.2.
There is a better approach that avoids that problem. We can redefine the
function quorumIntersection to accept an additional parameter D, so that
the function call quorumIntersection(F,D) determines whether FD has quo-
rum intersection. This can be achieved by redefining the functions traverseM-
inQuorums, greatestQuorum and containSlice, too, and equip them with
an additional parameter D in a similar fashion. Then the parameter D is for-
warded from quorumIntersection to greatestQuorum to containsSlice
and every reference to V in these algorithms is replaced by V \D. Additionally
we need to change the logic of the function containsSlice: replace line 2 for
the general FBAS version with
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if s \D ⊆ U return true
and replace line 1 for the simple FBAS version with
return |(U ∪D) ∩ q(v)| ≥ n(v)
While the change to the general FBAS version is obvious, the change to the
simple FBAS version requires some argument.
Lemma 5.5. Let F = (V, q, n) be a simple FBAS, let D,U ⊆ V and v ∈ U \D.
Then v has a quorum slice in FD contained in U if and only if |(U∪D)∩q(v)| ≥
n(v).
Proof. First we expand the simple FBAS (V, q, n) into its general form (V, S),
i.e., S(v) = {W ⊆ q(v) | v ∈ W, |W | = n(v)}. Next we construct FD =
(V \D,SD) with
SD(v) = {s \D | s ∈ S(v)} = {W \D |W ⊆ q(v), v ∈ W, |W | = n(v)}.
Then the following statements are equivalent: (i) v has a quorum slice in FD
contained in U , and (ii) there is a set W ⊆ q(v) with v ∈ W , |W | = n(v)
and W \D ⊆ U . It remains to prove that the latter statement is equivalent to
(iii) |(U ∪D) ∩ q(v)| ≥ n(v). For the direction (ii) ⇒ (iii) we get W ⊆ U ∪D
and therefore W ⊆ (U ∪D) ∩ q(v). Hence, n(v) = |W | ≤ |(U ∪D) ∩ q(v)|. For
the direction (iii) ⇒ (ii) we have v ∈ (U ∪ D) ∩ q(v), and therefore there is a
subset W ⊆ (U ∪ D) ∩ q(v) with |W | = n(v) and v ∈ W . This set W clearly
satisfies (ii).
Let us now prove the correctness of the algorithm intactNodes in Figure 8.
First we state an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Consider the i-th iteration of the loop of intactNodes and the
sets Q and Ui+1 constructed in that iteration. Suppose that there is a DSet D
with V \D ⊆ Ui. Then V \D ⊆ Q and if the iteration branches into line 8, also
V \D ⊆ Ui+1.
Proof. This statement is trivial if D = V . So let us assume that D 6= V ; then
V \D is a quorum because D is a DSet. Line 3 yields that Q is a quorum with
V \D ⊆ Q.
Now suppose that the iteration branches into line 8. Let Q1, Q2, W1 and
W2 be the values of the respective variables in iteration i. Let a ∈ {1, 2}. We
will show that
1. if Qa ⊆ D, then V \D ⊆Wa,
2. if Qa 6⊆ D, then Qa \D is a quorum in FD and Wa = ∅,
3. Q1 ⊆ D or Q2 ⊆ D.
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intactNodes
Input: FBAS F having quorum intersection with set of nodes V ; B ⊆ V
Output: the set of all B-intact nodes
1 U1 → V \B, i← 1
2 repeat
3 Q← greatestQuorum(F,Ui)
4 result← quorumIntersection(FV \Q)
5 if result = true
6 return Q
7 else
8 (Q1, Q2)← result
9 W1 ← greatestQuorum(F,Q \Q1)
10 W2 ← greatestQuorum(F,Q \Q2)
11 if W1 = ∅
12 Ui+1 ←W2
13 else if W2 = ∅
14 Ui+1 ←W1
15 else
16 Ui+1 ←W1 ∩W2
17 i← i+ 1
Figure 8: Algorithm for determining B-intact nodes given a set B of nodes.
The functions greatestQuorum and quorumIntersection are defined in
Section 3.
For the proof of the first claim we have that V \ D is a quorum contained in
Q \Qa, and hence V \D ⊆Wa.
For the proof of the second claim observe that Qa \ D 6= ∅. In particular,
Qa\(D∩Q) 6= ∅. Together with Lemma 4.2 applied to FV \Q and the fact thatQa
is a quorum of FV \Q, we obtain that Qa \ (D ∩Q) is a quorum in (FV \Q)D∩Q.
Clearly, Qa \ (D ∩ Q) = Qa \ D because Qa ⊆ Q by construction in line 4.
Furthermore, (FV \Q)D∩Q = FD by Corollary 4.3 and because (V \Q)∪(D∩Q) =
D due to V \D ⊆ Q. We conclude that Qa \D is a quorum in FD.
For the second claim it remains to show that Wa = ∅. We assume that Wa
is nonempty and derive a contradiction. Then Wa is a quorum by construction
and it intersects V \ D because we assumed that F has quorum intersection;
equivalently, Wa \D 6= ∅. By Lemma 4.2 applied to F we obtain that Wa \D
is a quorum in FD. The fact that D is a DSet implies that FD has quorum
intersection and, therefore, Qa \D and Wa \D intersect. This is a contradiction
to Wa ⊆ Q \Qa, which follows from the construction of Wa.
For the proof of the third claim assume that Q1 6⊆ D and that Q2 6⊆ D.
We will derive a contradiction. By the second claim, Q1 \ D and Q2 \ D are
quorums in FD. They intersect because D is a DSet and, thus, FD has quorum
intersection. This contradicts that Q1 and Q2 are disjoint by construction.
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Now we can employ our three claims to prove the lemma. By the third
claim Q1 ⊆ D or Q2 ⊆ D. Due to symmetry we will just consider the case that
Q1 ⊆ D. Then V \ D ⊆ W1 by the first claim and, hence, W1 6= ∅ because
we assumed D 6= V . Therefore the algorithm will not branch into line 12. If
Q2 6⊆ D, then by the second claim the algorithm will branch into line 14 and
we have V \D ⊆ W1 = Ui+1. If Q2 ⊆ D, then again ∅ 6= V \D ⊆ W2 and the
algorithm will branch into line 16 and we obtain V \D ⊆W1 ∩W2 = Ui+1.
Theorem 5.7. Given a set B the function intactNodes returns the set of all
B-intact nodes.
Proof. First we show that the function terminates by proving that the sequence
U1, U2, . . . is strictly decreasing, i.e., Ui+1 ( Ui for every i as long as the loop
does not terminate in line 6. Clearly, (i) Q ⊆ Ui (line 3), (ii) Q1 6= ∅ 6= Q2
as they are quorums, and (iii) W1 ⊆ Q \ Q1, W2 ⊆ Q \ Q2. These statements
together imply W1 ( Ui and W2 ( Ui. Then Ui+1 ( Ui because Ui+1 ⊆ W1 or
Ui+1 ⊆W2.
Next observe that when intactNodes terminates and returns a set Q in
line 6, then V \Q is a DSet because FV \Q has quorum intersetion (line 4) and
because Q is a quorum or empty (line 3). Moreover, V \Q contains B because
U1, U2, . . . is a decreasing sequence and U1∩B = ∅ by construction and therefore
also Q ∩B = ∅.
Let D be a DSet that contains B. Then V \ D ⊆ U1. From Lemma 5.6
it follows through a simple inductive proof that the result Q returned by the
function intactNodes satisfies V \D ⊆ Q or, equivalently, V \Q ⊆ D.
We have shown above that V \ Q is a DSet containing B. Hence, it is the
smallest DSet that contains B. Thus, Q is the set of all B-intact nodes.
Let us analyze the time complexity of the function intactNodes. In every
iteration of the loop the call to quorumIntersection dominates the time
complexity of the other three calls to greatestQuorum. In fact the former
function has exponential time complexity, say, c · 2n for some constant c, where
n is the number of nodes of the argument FBAS. The number n for the call
quorumIntersection(FV \Q) is |Q|, which is at most |V | − i + 1 in the i-th
iteration because Q ⊆ Ui and the Ui are a strictly decreasing sequence.
Since there are at most |V | + 1 iterations of the loop, we obtain that the
time complexity of intactNodes is roughly∑|V |
n=0
c · 2n ≤ c · 2|V |+1 ,
twice as long as determining quorumIntersection(V ).
6 Probabilistic intactness
Let (V, S) be an FBAS with quorum intersection. In this section we will study
the probability that a node v ∈ V is intact. We will treat the set B of ill-
behaved nodes as unknown and describe it as a random variable B. Let p be its
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probability distribution, i.e., p(B) = P(B = B). Observe that p : P(V )→ [0, 1]
with
∑
B⊆V p(B) = 1. Then for every v ∈ V we have
P(v is intact) =
∑
B⊆V
P(v is intact | B = B) · P(B = B) =
∑
B⊆V
v is B-intact
P(B = B)
=
∑
B⊆V
∃ DSet D: B ⊆ D ⊆ V \ {v}
p(B) . (9)
It is particularly interesting to consider the probability of a node to be intact
given that it is well-behaved. This is described by the following conditional
probability:
P(v is intact | v is well-behaved)
=
P(v is intact)
P(v is well-behaved)
(because intact implies well-behaved)
=
P(v is intact)∑
B⊆V P(v is well-behaved | B = B) · P(B = B)
=
P(v is intact)∑
B⊆V \{v} p(B)
. (10)
Let us illustrate the probabilistic intactness for some examples.
Example 6.1. Consider the symmetric simple FBAS (V, k) with V = {a, b, c, d}
and k = 3. Lemma 4.9 yields that the DSets are ∅, V , and all one-element
subsets of V . Thus,
P(a is intact) = p(∅) + p({b}) + p({c}) + p({d}) , (11)
and similarly for the nodes b, c and d.
Example 6.2. Consider the FBAS from Example 2.8. As stated already in
Example 4.6, the DSets are ∅, {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, V \ {7} and V . Thus,
P(v is intact) =


∑
B⊆{4,5,6} p(B), if v ∈ {1, 2, 3},∑
B⊆{1,2,3} p(B), if v ∈ {4, 5, 6},∑
B⊆V \{7} p(B), if v = 7.
In particular, P(7 is intact | 7 is well-behaved) = 1 by equation (10), i.e., node
7 will not become befouled if it is well-behaved, independent from the actual
probability distribution p. Note that this property holds for every FBAS that
has a well-behaved node v and a DSet that comprises all nodes except v. Another
way to show that P(7 is intact | 7 is well-behaved) = 1 is by using the fact that
C = {7} is the greatest SCC (see Figure 1): Clearly, C is the set of ∅-intact
nodes of (C, S|C) and then Corollary 5.4 implies that 7 is intact whenever it is
well-behaved.
Example 6.3. Suppose that the FBAS is built by 4 organizations that each
operate 3 nodes. We let V = A∪B∪C∪D with A = {a1, a2, a3} and likewise for
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the other organizations. We let O = {A,B,C,D} be the set of organizations.
Similar to Example 2.10, we suppose that the quorum slices are built by first
choosing 3 of the 4 organizations, and then choosing 2 nodes within each chosen
organization. Formally, let
T =
⋃
{O1,O2,O3}∈P3(O)
{
M1 ∪M2 ∪M3 |Mi ∈ P2(Oi)
}
,
with Pk(M) as in Definition 2.22. Now we define S(v) = {U ∈ T | v ∈ U} for all
v ∈ V . The resulting set of quorums is obtained by picking 3 or 4 organizations,
and then picking 2 or 3 nodes from each chosen organization. The FBAS has
quorum intersection and it is easy to check that the corresponding DSets are
given by ∅, V , each singleton set, and each set comprising a complete single
organization.
Let us determine P(a1 is intact). The set of all B ⊆ V such that there is a
DSet D with B ⊆ D ⊆ V \ {a1} is given by{
∅, {a2}, {a3}
}
∪
⋃
O∈{B,C,D}
P(O) \ {∅}. (12)
Observe that all unions in (12) are disjoint and hence
P(a1 is intact) = p(∅) + p({a2}) + p({a3}) +
∑
O∈{B,C,D}
∑
∅6=O′⊆O
p(O′). (13)
Similar expressions can be derived for the other nodes in V by symmetry.
Let us now discuss some interesting special cases for the distribution p.
6.1 At most one ill-behaved node
If at most one node can be ill-behaved, i.e, p(B) = 0 for |B| > 1, we have
P(v is intact) = p(∅) +
∑
u∈Uv
p({u}) = 1−
∑
u∈V \Uv
p({u}),
where Uv is the union of all DSets that do not contain v. Note that our assump-
tion that (V, S) has quorum intersection implies that ∅ is a DSet. Furthermore,
P(v is intact | v is well-behaved) =
p(∅) +
∑
u∈Uv
p({u})
p(∅) +
∑
u∈V \{v} p({u})
=
p(∅) +
∑
u∈Uv
p({u})
1− p({v})
. (14)
Example 6.4 (continuation of Example 6.1). Suppose that
p(∅) = 0.6, p({a}) = 0.2, p({b}) = p({c}) = 0.1, p({d}) = 0.
By (11), P(a is intact) = 0.8. Likewise, P(b is intact) = P(c is intact) = 0.9
and P(d is intact) = 1. With (14) we conclude furthermore that the conditional
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probability of each node to be intact given that it is well-behaved is 1 because
Uv = V \ {v} for each node v.
Note that the latter property carries over to a large class of symmetric simple
FBAS (V, k): If |V | − 1 ≥ k ≥ |V |/2 + 1, then Lemma 4.9 implies that every
one-element subset of V is a DSet. We thus get Uv = V \ {v} for every v ∈ V
and consequently P(v is intact | v is well-behaved) = 1.
Example 6.5 (continuation of Example 6.2). Since the DSets are ∅, {1, 2, 3},
{4, 5, 6}, V \ {7}, and V , we obtain
U1 = U2 = U3 = {4, 5, 6}, U4 = U5 = U6 = {1, 2, 3}, U7 = V \ {7}.
From this we conclude that
P(v is intact) =


p(∅) + p({4}) + p({5}) + p({6}) , if v ∈ {1, 2, 3},
p(∅) + p({1}) + p({2}) + p({3}) , if v ∈ {4, 5, 6},
1− p({7}) , if v = 7.
6.2 Independent failures
Let us suppose that ill-behavior only occurs due to random and non-coordinated
failures of nodes. We can model this case by assuming that the events of distinct
nodes to be ill-behaved are independent, and that a single node v becomes ill-
behaved with probability pv. Thus, for every B ⊆ V we have
p(B) =
∏
u∈B
pu ·
∏
u∈V \B
(1− pu) ,
and therefore
P(v is intact) =
∑
B⊆V
∃ DSet D: B ⊆ D ⊆ V \ {v}
∏
u∈B
pu ·
∏
u∈V \B
(1− pu) .
Note that ∑
B⊆V \{v}
p(B) =
∑
B⊆V \{v}
∏
u∈B
pu ·
∏
u∈V \B
(1 − pu) = 1− pv,
which is easy to show by induction. Then (10) yields
P(v is intact | v is well-behaved) =
P(v is intact)
1− pv
.
Example 6.6 (continuation of Example 6.1). Suppose that
pa = 0.2, pb = pc = 0.1, pd = 0,
then by (11),
P(a is intact) = 0.8 · 0.92 + 0.8 · 0.1 · 0.9 + 0.8 · 0.9 · 0.1 + 0 = 0.792.
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Similarly,
P(b is intact) = P(c is intact) = 0.882, P(d is intact) = 0.954.
For the conditional probabilities we have
P(a is intact | a is well-behaved) = 0.99,
P(b is intact | b is well-behaved) = 0.98, (same for c)
P(d is intact | d is well-behaved) = 0.954.
Observe that the conditional probability for a to be intact is higher than for
the other three nodes. This is because we assume that a is well-behaved and
therefore it can only become befouled if at least one of the other nodes is ill-
behaved. However, these nodes are more likely to be well-behaved than node a.
Example 6.7 (continuation of Example 6.2). For node 1 there are precisely
two DSets D with D ⊆ V \ {1}, namely the sets ∅ and {4, 5, 6}. Then
P(1 is intact) =
∑
B⊆{4,5,6}
∏
u∈B pu ·
∏
u∈V \B 1− pu
= (1 − p1) · (1− p2) · (1 − p3) · (1− p7),
and
P(1 is intact | 1 is well-behaved) = (1 − p2) · (1− p3) · (1 − p7).
The computation is similar for the other nodes in V \ {7}.
6.3 Grouping of nodes
Let us generalize the previous case by assuming that the nodes are associated
with entities or organizations (as in Example 2.10 or Example 6.3) that act
independently. Therefore, we can assume that the ill-behavior of different orga-
nizations is statistically independent. More precisely, we assume a partitioning
O of V , where every element of the partitioning consists of the nodes of a single
organization, and a probability distribution pO over P(O) for every O ∈ O.
Then we define
p(B) =
∏
O∈O
pO(B ∩O).
In practice the quorum slices of nodes within one organization will presum-
ably be set up in a way that all nodes of the organization trust each other;
equivalently, for every organization there is an SCC of the trust graph con-
taining all nodes of the organization. This implies that every trust cluster of
the FBAS is a union of organizations due to Lemma 2.19. In this case we
can simplify the computation of the probabilistic intactness of a node within a
trust cluster – it is determined completely by the nodes of the trust cluster and
independent from the nodes outside the trust cluster.
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Lemma 6.8. Suppose that for every organization O ∈ O there is an SCC that
contains O. Let Z be a trust cluster and v ∈ Z. Then
P(v is intact) =
∑
B⊆Z
∃ DSet D of (Z, S|Z): B ⊆ D ⊆ Z \ {v}
∏
O∈O,O⊆Z
pO(B ∩O) .
Proof. First observe that Lemma 2.19 implies that for every organizationO ∈ O
either O ⊆ Z or O ⊆ V \ Z. Let us distinguish between these two kinds of
organizations and putOin = {O ∈ O | O ⊆ Z} andOout = {O ∈ O | O ⊆ V \Z}.
Then O = Oin ∪ Oout. We derive
P(v is intact) =
∑
B⊆V
v is B-intact in (V, S)
p(B)
=
∑
B⊆V
v is B ∩ Z-intact in (Z, S|Z)
p(B) (by Theorem 5.3)
=
∑
Bin⊆Z
v is Bin-intact in (Z, S|Z)
∑
Bout⊆V \Z
p(Bin ∪Bout)
=
∑
Bin⊆Z
v is Bin-intact in (Z, S|Z)
∑
Bout⊆V \Z
∏
O∈O
pO((Bin ∪Bout) ∩O)
=
∑
Bin⊆Z
v is Bin-intact in (Z, S|Z)
∑
Bout⊆V \Z
( ∏
O∈Oin
pO(Bin ∩O)
)
·
( ∏
O∈Oout
pO(Bout ∩O)
)
=
∑
Bin⊆Z
v is Bin-intact in (Z, S|Z)
( ∏
O∈Oin
pO(Bin ∩O)
)
·
∑
Bout⊆V \Z
( ∏
O∈Oout
pO(Bout ∩O)
)
It suffices to show that
∑
Bout⊆V \Z
∏
O∈Oout
pO(Bout ∩ O) = 1. Let Oout =
{O1, . . . , On} and observe that
⋃n
i=1 Oi = V \ Z. Then∑
Bout⊆V \Z
∏
O∈Oout
pO(Bout ∩O) =
∑
B1⊆O1,...,Bn⊆On
∏n
i=1
pOi(Bi)
=
∏n
i=1
∑
Bi⊆Oi
pOi(Bi) = 1,
which concludes the proof.
Note that Lemma 6.8 also applies to the probability distributions discussed
in Section 6.2 as they are special cases of the probability distributions in this
section.
Example 6.9 (continuation of Example 6.3). Let us study our example for the
partitioning O. For every O ∈ O let eO = pO(∅). Then we can reformulate the
right hand side of (13) as(
eA + pA({a2}) + pA({a3})
)
eBeCeD +
∑
O∈{B,C,D}
∑
∅6=O′⊆O
pO(O′)
∏
O′′∈O\{O}
eO′′
38
=
(
eA + pA({a2}) + pA({a3})
)
eBeCeD +
∑
O∈{B,C,D}
(1 − eO)
∏
O′′∈O\{O}
eO′′
(⋆)
=
(
eA + pA({a2}) + pA({a3})
)
eBeCeD
+ (1 − eB)eAeCeD + (1 − eC)eAeBeD + (1 − eD)eAeBeC .
At (⋆) we used that fact that pO is a probability distribution over P(O) and
therefore
∑
∅6=O′⊆O pO(O
′) = 1− eO.
Suppose that eA = eB = eC = eD and let us refer to this value as e. Then
P(a1 is intact) = e3
(
pA({a2}) + pA({a3}) + 3− 2e
)
. (15)
6.4 Grouping of nodes with Byzantine failures
Finally, let us consider a specialization of the previous case and assume a simple
model of the probability distribution pO of every element O ∈ O. Our model
is based on the assumption that nodes within an organization can become ill-
behaved for two reasons: (i) random failures that are statistically independent
and (ii) the organization experiences a Byzantine fault and all nodes of the
organization become ill-behaved.
For every O ∈ O we presuppose the probability qO (the probability of a
single node of the organization to fail randomly) and the probability rO (the
probability of all the nodes of the organization O to become Byzantine). Then
for every B ⊆ O we define
pO(B) =
{
rO + (1 − rO) · (qO)|O| , if B = O,
(1− rO) · (qO)|B| · (1− qO)|O|−|B| , otherwise.
Observe that pO is indeed a probability distribution.
Example 6.10 (continuation of Example 6.9). Let qO and rO be the proba-
bilities for organization O. Let us suppose that all qO are identical for each
organization and likewise for rO, and let us simply refer to these values as q and
r. Then e = pO(∅) = (1 − r) · (1 − q)3. Furthermore, pA({a2}) = pA({a3}) =
(1− r) · q · (1− q)2. Then from (15) we derive
P(a1 is intact) = (1− r)3(1− q)9
(
2(1− r)q(1 − q)2 + 3− 2(1− r)(1 − q)3
)
.
For example, if q = 0.1 and r = 0.01, then P(a1 is intact) ≈ 0.65. By symmetry
all nodes have the same probability to be intact.
The FBAS in Example 6.10 is not the only way to arrange four organiza-
tions with three nodes per organization. We could also lay out the nodes as a
symmetric simple FBAS. We will study this FBAS in the following example.
Example 6.11. Consider the symmetric simple FBAS (V, 8), where V = A ∪
B ∪ C ∪ D is defined as in Example 6.3. From Lemma 4.9 we know that the
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DSets are V and every subset of V having at most 3 elements. Therefore, for
every v ∈ V ,
P(v is intact) =
∑
B⊆V \{v},|B|≤3
p(B).
This sum is combinatorially more complex than the expression in Example 6.10.
However, assuming identical probability values q and r for each organization as
in Example 6.10, we can group the sets B into categories as many of them have
the same value for p(B). We consider the following five categories of sets B:
(i) having 0 members, (ii) having 1 member, (iii) having 2 members, (iv) having
3 members, not all in one organization, and (v) a complete organization. Then
we find that there is 1 set in category (i), 11 sets in category (ii), 55 sets in
category (iii), 162 sets in category (iv), and 3 sets in category (v). For example,
all sets in category (iii) satisfy p(B) = (1− r)4 · q2 · (1− q)10, so that we obtain
P(v is intact) = (1− r)4 · (1 − q)12 + 11 · (1− r)4 · q · (1− q)11
+ 55 · (1− r)4 · q2 · (1− q)10 + 162 · (1 − r)4 · q3 · (1− q)9
+ 3 · (1− r)3 · (1− q)9 ·
(
r + (1− r) · q3
)
.
For the values q = 0.1 and r = 0.01 as in Example 6.10 we get P(v is intact) ≈
0.86 for every v ∈ V . We observe that the probability that a node becomes
befouled in case of the symmetric simple FBAS is significantly smaller (by a
factor of approximately 2.5) than for the hierarchical FBAS in Example 6.3.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have discussed the main concepts of the federated Byzantine
agreement system as defined by Mazières [13], in particular quorum and quorum
intersection, and intactness of nodes. We have illustrated these concepts with
several examples, ranging from small “academic” cases to the greatest strongly
connected component of the current Stellar network; see Example 2.26. In our
discussion of intactness, we have clarified the relation between Mazières’ original
definition and the more recent definitions in [10, 9], and we have introduced
the subslice property as a condition for equivalence of the two concepts; see
Section 4.2.
We have treated the problems of quorum enumeration and quorum intersec-
tion as well as the intactness of nodes from an algorithmic point of view. We
have shown that the quorum split decision problem is NP-complete even for
the special class of simple FBAS, which we introduced in this paper; see Def-
inition 2.11. Based on the work of Lachowski [7], we have derived algorithms
for quorum enumeration, checking quorum intersection, and computing intact
nodes. Some computed examples with our implementations of these algorithms
in the Python package Stellar Observatory9 are given is this paper; see, e.g.,
9https://github.com/andrenarchy/stellar-observatory
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Example 2.26 and Figure 5. In order to derive the algorithms, prove their cor-
rectness and reduce their complexity we have introduced several new concepts
including the trust graph and trust clusters of an FBAS; see Section 2.2.
In the final section of this paper we have treated intactness from a proba-
bilistic point of view, and we have studied the probability that a node is intact
in different scenarios of ill-behaved nodes. Of particular interest in this con-
text is the intactness probability in hierarchical FBAS settings as the ones in
Example 2.10, which we then discussed in Examples 6.3, 6.9, and 6.10.
In Example 6.11 we have shown that from the viewpoint of the intactness
probability, the symmetric simple FBAS is superior to a hierarchical FBAS.
This observation not only holds for the simplified probability distribution we
considered, but in fact for every probability distribution p, which is immediately
clear from the definition of probabilistic intactness in (9): The set of DSets in
Example 6.3 is a proper subset of the set of DSets in Example 6.11. Therefore,
no probabilistic intactness in the hierarchical FBAS exceeds the corresponding
probabilistic intactness in the symmetric simple FBAS.
In Sections 3.3.1 and 5.1 we have shown that intersection and intactness
properties of the greatest SCC (and more generally any trust cluster) of an
FBAS are independent from the remainder of the FBAS. Therefore, this com-
ponent of the FBAS can be studied in isolation, and this property carries over to
probabilistic intactness; see Lemma 6.8. A similar argument as in Example 6.11
then shows that the probabilistic intactness of nodes in the hierarchical setup of
the greatest SCC of the FBAS in Example 2.26 (with quorum slices containing
11, 12 or 13 nodes) will not be larger than in a symmetric simple FBAS with
k = 12.
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